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Seizing and Stretching Participatory Space:  
Civil Society Participation in Tanzania’s Policy 
Processes1  
Hermine Engel 
 
Abstract 
This paper takes as its starting point the perspective that civil society participation in 
governance—particularly policy processes such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
(PRSPs) and related policy developments—largely takes on a mere consultative rather than 
a transformative role when initiated and driven by government or donors. In order to 
understand attempts at changing this situation, the paper explores the experiences and 
strategies of civil society organisations specifically linked to the Policy Forum network in 
Tanzania in its objective to transform the consultative engagement to a more meaningful 
re-politicised participatory engagement. The emerging factors and key findings indicate that 
the following aspects require considerable attention: (1) engagement in both invited and 
autonomous spaces to avoid co-optation; (2) strategic coalitions to avoid situations of 
dominance and control; (3) representation informed by political responsibility; (4) front-
stage local engagement with back-stage international support; and (5) linking the macro and 
micro policy considerations within larger political processes. These factors point to an 
increasing awareness and strategic negotiation of the dynamics affecting civil society 
participation in policy processes. Furthermore, they indicate that these dynamics need to be 
continually assessed and evaluated within the changing political landscape so that civil 
society is able to position itself more effectively to influence policy towards transforming 
the structural conditions which perpetuate poverty. 
 
About the author 
Hermine Engel graduated from the Institute of Social Studies-ISS in 2006 with a Major in 
Politics of Alternative Development. Currently she is employed as the Programme Manager 
for Planact, a local South African NGO based in Johannesburg, South Africa. 
                                                 
1 This working paper is based on the author’s research paper written in compliance with the 
requirements for obtaining the degree of Masters of Arts in Development Studies at the Institute of 
Social Studies, finalized in December 2006. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A number of studies2 indicate that as a result of the mainstreaming of the participation 
phenomenon in the donor and government sectors, participation in policy processes has 
largely been reduced to consultation to serve certain dominant interests. This paper 
presents the key findings of a research study exploring the strategies of civil society 
organisations (CSOs) to ensure more meaningful participatory engagement in influencing 
policy decisions and implementation towards poverty reduction and securing citizen 
rights.3 
d 
 of 
relation to the factors affecting civil society participation in Tanzania’s policy processes.  
s 
a 
ode of 
shortsighted approach to Tanzania’s development options’ (Gould and Ojanen 2003: 7). 
hat 
e’ 
en 
                                                
The findings elaborated on in this paper are drawn from the case study research conducte
in August 2006 focusing on the role of a civil society umbrella body—the Policy Forum 
(PF)—in the Tanzanian Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and subsequent related 
policy processes.4 The paper elaborates on five themes which emerged from the analysis
the perceptions and experiences of the various actors, and of the theoretical debates in 
BACKGROUND  
Tanzania was considered eligible for debt relief in 1999 under the World Bank and IMF’
Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. To qualify for debt cancellation, the 
preparation of the PRSP was required as a conditionality, emphasising participation of 
broad range of stakeholders—including civil society actors—with the goal of national 
ownership. The PRSP process, has received criticism because of it’s ‘de-politicised m
technocratic governance’. Recent studies regard the PRSP process as ‘a limited and 
The Policy Forum (PF) engagement with the PRSP processes was based on the view t
‘there is now more room for civil society to make a difference than there used to b
(Gould and Ojanen 2003: 7). Established in 2002 by a group of CSOs involved in 
advocacy, the PF has its roots in the identified need for a more effective civil society 
approach to policy engagement after the first meeting in Tanzania to include civil society 
participation in the PRSP process.5 Its engagement is located in three policy processes se
as critical to human rights and development: the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS), the 
Public Expenditure Review (PER) focusing on equitable resource allocation in the budget, 
 
2 See for example, the collection of articles in Hickey and Mohan (2004) and also in Cooke and 
Kothari (2001). 
3 This research study occurred as a result of academic-practitioner cooperation between the 
Institute of Social Studies (ISS) and Hivos (a Dutch donor organization) and focused on the work 
of a HIVOS partner in Tanzania, The Policy Forum. This internship experience in turn provided 
the empirical basis for the final research paper submitted in partial fulfillment of an MA Degree in 
Development Studies obtained at the ISS in December 2006. 
4 The research study fieldwork was conducted in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania in August 2006 and 
involved direct interviews with 19 persons, who represented member organisations of The Policy 
Forum and the government and donor sectors involved in the PRSP processes  
5 The Consultative Group Meeting (2001); the CGM is an annual public grant meeting, where 
donors, government and CS sectors meet to assess and agree on a working framework for the next 
year. 
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and Local Government Reforms (LGR) towards improving bottom-up decentralisation 
(Policy Forum 2003: 5-6).  
The PF is regarded as a ‘strategic engagement’ to enhance policy advocacy capacity, which 
is necessary since many CSOs have largely been involved in service delivery, while demand 
for participation in policy processes is increasing at a rapid pace (Hakikazi 2002: 8). The ke
objective is to ‘[build] on the collective and individual experiences to date to create a mor
systematic approach to policy engagement’ (ibid.). Underlying this objective and reflecting 
the transformative understanding of participation is the view put forward by the PF that 
‘this [objective] will help to avoid the reactive, one-off method of participation that has 
come to be expected of civil society by the government and donors’ (Hakikazi 2002: 8). At 
the time of the research, the PF counted 94 members including NGOs, research 
y 
e 
 
e 
n, international vs local 
in ve 
neg
. There are those who advocate strong forms of autonomy (to 
avoid cooptation, goal displacement, and worse), others who favour engagement while 
ome 
s in trying to put your point across but 
                                                
organizations and NGO networks. Of those 94 members, 77 were Tanzanian organizations 
and 17 were international organizations operating in Tanzania. 
PF respondents engaged in this study expressed the general sense that participation needed 
to be more meaningful than mere consultation and that it had to include a focus on 
decision-making power towards transformative possibilities. Through the PF, organisations
attempted and considered various strategies towards this end. These strategies reveal a 
number of key issues problematised by differing perceptions and experiences as the 
participatory space is negotiated and manipulated. Five key emerging thematic issues wer
identified in the study: co-optation, coordination, representatio
dynamics, and engagement in larger political processes.  
CO-OPTATION—‘BEING PARTICIPATED’ 
In civil society’s attempts to influence government policy, different levels of engagement 
are pursued depending on the organisation’s intention and ability to influence government 
policy. Houtzager’s (2003) reasoning regarding the different levels of engagement is useful 
exploring the perceptions and experiences of the ways in which CSOs in Tanzania ha
otiated and debated entry into the participatory space. According to Houtzager, 
[one] of the central questions among actors … in civil society is how, and what kind of 
autonomy organizations of the poor should develop from political parties, elite groups, 
and agents of the state
maintaining relative autonomy, and then those who support entry into stable alliances. 
(Houtzager 2003: 92) 
A key fear among civil society organisations in participating in the government-initiated 
space is that of co-optation as indicated by civil society practitioners interviewed: ‘s
people will say you are bought by the government when you are sitting there’, and further 
qualified by the view that ‘the frustration lie
decisions are taken in your presence so you are seen as part of those making and 
supporting the decision’.6  
 
6 Direct interviews with Policy Forum representatives, August 2006. 
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These views can be related to the notion that the government’s interest in civil society 
participation is merely to show that civil society has sanctioned decisions taken by virtue
its presence at the meeting, thus fulfilling the donor conditionality. Reports of ‘bei
participated’ were exp
 of 
ng 
ressed in cases where decisions between government and donors 
were already agreed upon before the actual participatory meetings to which representatives 
ty itself. The 
challenge for civil society participation from a donor perspective is perceived to be related 
f 
on government has just begun to make itself felt, and that much more work needs 
to be done in terms of capacity-building in the areas of policy, data analysis and research. 
 
t 
 
anding of and effective participation in the government-
invited space. It was agreed that it should be ready (and even anticipate) to participate when 
ation 
on 
 
embers. It has also 
negotiated to get its views included in the Joint Assistance Strategy (JAS) document (to 
 its 
While the Policy Forum has, as a network of organizations, participated directly in the 
of civil society were invited. The presence of civil society members is thus perceived as 
mere ‘window dressing’ to meet the donor conditionality and to keep the various 
stakeholders happy.  
According to all respondents, participation is recognised on paper but not practised in 
reality due to the challenges presented both by government and civil socie
to the status quo in Tanzania which is a result of its historical, cultural and social 
background which gives much respect and power to those in authority, as is also reflected 
in government where there is the tradition of not questioning authority.  
On the part of civil society, respondents echoed the view that the influence or impact o
NGOs 
Strengthening the capacity of CSOs is seen as a step towards a more constructive form of
advocacy which is preferable to simply complaining and lamenting about governmen
policy. 
With the realisation that the government-invited space made room for ‘just participation
without much meaning’, the PF’s existence became geared towards making its own 
participation more meaningful through ensuring access to information for all, getting 
people to think about government choices and resource allocation. Its role is seen as 
providing a critical voice to the proceedings and issues under discussion. The PF felt it 
important to continuously engage in the processes in a more systematic and consistent way, 
in order to increase its underst
accepting the call for participation in the government-initiated space. Hence it was decided 
to make strategic selective decisions as to what to engage in, and to what extent, in rel
to its capacity and expertise.  
Examples of the PF’s successes include the much acclaimed position paper commenting 
each of the priority sectors of the PRSP (NGO Policy Forum 2002). Also during the 
annual Poverty Policy week, civil society participants’ views—through the conduit of the
PF—were taken on board. Open discussion with government was seen as instrumental in 
making sure that it institutionalised a participation framework in each technical working 
group with four to five spaces secured for civil society as equal m
coordinate and harmonise aid flows), which now includes a section on participation and
implementation. In addition it is dialoguing with donors about how to make civil society 
stronger, including discussions on funding needs and priorities.  
government-initiated participatory spaces, member organisations (affiliates) have also had 
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the freedom to engage in alternative strategies to influence government policy.7 For 
instance, some affiliates also came up with their own complementary parallel engagement 
strategies to build the capacity of their staff and members, and the broader community to
improve their abilities to participate in the government-initiated spaces and to enga
policy development in general. Other affiliates, however, opted for minimal direct 
engagement with government after years of dealing with negative experiences of co-
optation. These organisations have reported that they have instead engaged in pursuing 
independent analysis and the more populist work of building human capacity. The
is that civil society does not have to ‘play the [participatory] game by the rules of 
government’, instead
 
ge in 
ir advice 
 they should find different routes not entirely dictated by government 
to influence policy.  
 
 as 
l 
lso 
 
 
f 
tive response 
to policy matters under discussion through advocacy and capacity building.  
 
licy 
-
n 
 
 taken, 
 
                               
For civil society then to manipulate or use the participatory space effectively, it needs to ‘be
informed of where boundaries of truthful engagement are and where co-optation starts’
one respondent of the Policy Forum emphasised. In this discussion PF members were 
cautioned that if participation is squarely within the government-initiated space, then it wil
be difficult to challenge decisions put forward and thus civil society ‘representatives’ may 
be coerced into agreement. But respondents (notably the PF chairperson at the time) a
felt that ‘if there is a chance to participate then it helps because when they call you to 
participate it shows they trust you and will thus [be willing to] listen’. On the other hand, 
the alternative put forward is for civil society to create its own agenda independently of the
government, but the possibility is that ‘if you are outside, they will not take you seriously’.
The strategy advised is a ‘50/50 participation strategy so that when there is no chance o
being listened to, the option remains to go outside of that space to create self-initiated 
participatory spaces’ where civil society can develop its own agenda and effec
These views indicate different levels of engagement: direct, minimal, and strong autonomy,
depending on the level of policy influence desired and deemed attainable. To some extent 
they echo Houtzager’s argument that ‘[if] an actor’s goal is to influence policy, rather than 
self-provisioning, then the strong autonomy position is the least tenable’ (Houtzager 2003: 
92). He argues that the ability for CSOs working on behalf of the poor to influence po
is enhanced by ‘alliances with reformist elements within the state’ but also warns that 
entering into such alliances ‘inevitably surrenders some degree of autonomy’ (ibid.). In the 
experiences of CSOs raised above, entering the invited space has led to experiences of co
optation by pressure to affirm decisions already taken. This is particularly evident whe
civil society has not been effectively prepared for such an engagement due to limited
capacity, often seen as engineered by government procedures and prior agreements 
between government and donors. When CSOs have been able to challenge decisions
they have also been sidelined by government which in future invites more agreeable 
representatives to participate in government-initiated spaces. These experiences have 
largely steered CSOs in this study (such as PF members) to opt for minimal engagement,
while at the same time creating alternative, more autonomous spaces to influence policy 
decisions more effectively. Seemingly then, their decisions are informed by an engagement 
                  
7 While these different engagements may seem contradictory, it relates to the value of the type of 
loose coordination the Policy Forum network practices, a point we explore in more detail in the 
next section on strategic coalitions and coordination.  
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where they are able to ‘[play] the system as best [they] can’ to ‘influence and enlarge [their] 
“room for manoeuvre” through particular strategies’ (Webster and Engberg-Pedersen 
ng members of the civil society sector is that of 
ian civil society is said to lack the necessary coordination to 
 
 
ted 
uld 
e 
 a large extent also seem to have a preference for supporting coordination 
 
en 
ate 
s 
 
 
 more critical PF members 
through this replacement. This situation has had a negative effect on the way in which the 
2002: 19). 
STRATEGIC COALITIONS VS COORDINATION 
One of the key strategies noted amo
building strategic coalitions to strengthen civil society’s strategic positioning aimed at 
having a greater impact on policy decisions. Yet strategic coalitions are understood in 
different ways across sectors; for some it entails more formal coordination and for others 
less formal networking coalitions.  
For the most part, Tanzan
effectively participate in policy processes. This view, more often taken by government and
donor sectors, is based on the claim that there is a lack of a central coordinating unit, and 
thus government uses the excuse that it is not sure of who to invite to participatory forums
to represent civil society. 
Within the PF coalition there are also those supporting the view that a more coordina
civil society would present a stronger force to be reckoned with. Such coordination would 
counter government’s strategic excuse of an uncoordinated civil society presenting 
problems in selecting who should fill the participatory space which civil society is to 
occupy. The potential strength of coordination would make civil society an effective 
medium for sending a stronger message to government spaces, whereby civil society co
have a greater influence in shaping the policy agenda. Those who hold this view see th
need for a strong leadership to prevent government from being able to divide civil society, 
and from taking action against single organisations as it tends to do in the sidelining (and 
silencing) of organisations and individual ‘representatives’ with whom it is in conflict. 
Donors to
attempts among civil society. The establishment of coordinating bodies is seen to have the 
potential of better understanding civil society needs, and nurturing the development of 
expertise, and thus has the advantage of contributing more effectively to the development 
process.  
More critical voices from leading members within the civil society sector claim that donor 
and government sectors emphasise coordination because it allows them to exercise greater
control over civil society activities through the coordinating body, under the guise or op
intention of better understanding civil society views. A strong correlation is seen here 
between coordination and control, which conveniently produces the conditions to facilit
manipulation and co-optation in the desired directions or interests of those in power. An 
example cited is the EU’s attempt at coordinating the formation of a non-state actors’ 
(NSA) coordinating body established in 2005 to incorporate NGOs, media, trade union
and the private sector. This attempt was met with conflicting and skeptical views about 
donor and government-driven coordinating initiatives. This was exacerbated by the actions
of the newly formed NSA task team which created even more skepticism as it was seen to
operate outside of its mandate in accepting participatory invitations from government 
sectors sidelining the more established but less comfortable,
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task team—and more broadly, this coordination attempt—is being viewed from the civil 
society sector. Coordination can thus have a negative effect, depending on who steers the 
attempt, with what means, and whose interests are served.  
The NSA example aside, coordination is also seen as involving too much compromise for 
civil society for the purpose of fitting into a neat package which government can easily de
with. The broad umbrella of ‘civil society’ under which diverse groups and organisations 
are to be categorised, coordinated and represented is seen as a virtually impossible sce
in that civil society cannot be contained in one neat coordinated package to speak with a 
single unified voice on issues in the policy arena. This also echoes the views expressed in 
Howell and Pearce, who criticise the ‘homogenizing and harmonizing visions of civil 
society within the mainstream … [informing] a rejection or skepticism toward the 
mainstream’s stress on consensus rather than conflict and on influence rather than power’ 
(Howell and Pearce 2001: 33). Perhaps then, as suggested in some of the interviews and 
further reinforced by Howell and Pearce (2001), civil society may be a stronger force, 
al 
nario 
ategy 
ith 
ue-
ons are seen to provide the necessary ‘room 
 the view that ‘the PF’s way of strategic linkages is better 
ed 
organisation and/or individuals to invite to 
 
 
supported by the view expressed in an interview that ‘if we in the NGO community stand 
maintaining its critical edge, when less tightly coordinated. This would imply a str
which values diversity for the necessary open and honest debate to grapple with issues w
due diligence and to find different alliances to best meet the desired objectives.  
Such a strategy may lie in the current forms of ‘loose’ coalitions and networking 
arrangements in terms of issue-based coalitions and multi-networking flows. Presenting 
more fluid, permeable structures, organisations can express their diverse views along iss
based sectoral linkages as well as forms of engagement where it can best find support and 
unified expression where and when necessary. The PF is structured in such a way that it is 
an umbrella for different networks desiring to associate in different ways best suited to 
meet their objectives within the broader goal of transforming the structural conditions 
which perpetuate poverty. Such strategic coaliti
for maneuver’ as expressed in
because civil society is stronger when it is more diverse’. 
REPRESENTATION  
The arguments put forward for a better coordinated civil society are also said to be link
to the issue of representation. Government and donor sectors have indicated that it is 
difficult to decide who to invite to represent the civil society sector because the sector is 
not centrally and hence not strongly coordinated in their view. Both government and 
donors, and also some within the civil society sector, favour stronger coordination to 
facilitate the selection process as to which 
represent the civil society sector according to the limited number of spaces available. Often
critical civil society views are silenced or sidelined on the basis of what government sees 
and uses as ‘their lack of representivity’.  
This issue also does not (completely) escape the somewhat looser coordination structures
of umbrella bodies and various sector coalitions. For most of the interviewees within these 
groups and those called upon to fill the civil society space at government-initiated 
participatory meetings, representation involves attending a meeting with a clear mandate 
from their constituencies as to what views to put forward and what decisions to take, as 
well as to provide regular feedback to their constituencies. Such an understanding is 
10 Hermine Engel 
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on a platform we need to be clear on who we claim to be and on whose behalf we claim to
speak.’  
However, a number of problems face the issue of actual representation as it is commonly 
understood—i.e., speaking for a constituency after consultation with a clear mandate and 
feedback. Respondents point to the fact that Tanzania is a large country with a limited and 
limiting infrastructure to reach the widely dispersed constituencies. Besides being widely 
dispersed, ‘representative participation’ is therefore considered difficult since there is also a 
large number of CSOs: there are over 4000 registered NGOs. The limited time factor also 
does not allow for the form of representation described above since there is often 
enough time between receiving notice, documentation and effective in-depth consultation
 
not 
. 
ong members of the ‘civil society’ 
Be er 
PF
h is 
re it 
u 
ng to the table—what research or data is used ... What is important is the 
credibility of the evidence … don’t say you are speaking on behalf of this particular 
acy to 
n 
ecure full consultation to reach consensus, the result 
 
s 
                                                
These practical problems are further complicated by limited financial resources to 
communicate with the various constituencies effectively.  
Others also argue that it is difficult to try to find a representative voice because they are 
uncertain as to who they are to speak on behalf of. This is related to the definitional 
problem of ‘civil society’ especially in the Tanzanian case, where this is not clearly 
demarcated and varies among ministries and even am
sector itself. It is even more problematic when this is used as an excuse on the part of 
government not to invite civil society participation.  
sides the practical and definitional problems raised above, respondents (such as a form
 chairperson) presented the concern about representation as follows: 
Although it is a genuine attempt, it can become romanticised at the policy level whic
abstract and fast-moving and doesn’t have the practice of deep consultation. Therefo
is not realistic to expect real representation ... The more important test lies in what yo
are bringi
constituency—you should be evaluated on the strength of your [own] analysis of the 
issues. 8  
Here the credibility of the evidence put forward to support a certain view as well as the 
underlying values and ethics of those working on behalf of the poor, vulnerable and 
marginalised sectors are seen as particularly significant in enhancing an actor’s legitim
influence policy. In this sense the notion of ‘political responsibility’ put forward by Jorda
and van Tuijl (2000) seems to support the view that what is crucial is the message 
underscored by a value-driven, ethical motivation. ‘Political responsibility’ is seen to 
encompass and underlie the values on which notions of representativity, legitimacy and 
accountability are carried forward. Too often, as the PF coordinator pointed out, even 
when practical attempts are made to s
may be ‘something so watered-down to please as many views as possible and to make 
everyone feel represented’.  
The PF, often called upon to represent the views of civil society, has realistically (and also 
ideologically) tried to face this issue of representativity. Initially it was easy for government
in terms of the PRS review to approach the PF to represent civil society since it was seen a
 
8 Direct interview with former Policy Forum chairperson, August 2006. 
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pulling together a number of key organisations, as fairly well organised and well versed 
policy matters. Yet the PF coordinator pointed out that it ‘represents’ approximately only
90 organisations, and therefore does not claim to represent civil society in its entirety. 
Attempts are made to seek input from a cross-section of the sector but realistically the 
entire sector cannot be reached. In response to government’s call for PF representation, 
acknowledging that it speaks on behalf of civil society when convenient, PF said it cannot be 
‘gate-keeping’ because many organisations do not necessarily agree with everything put 
forward by the PF. Instead, it has strategically agreed to help spread information to other 
major networks and engage in capacity building for people to more effectively be involve
in policy matters. It also continues to put its views forward and to enter into debate as the 
PF, and in most cases, as smaller coalitions or single organisations within its framework. It
sees itself as ‘many voices among many others’ which in e
in 
 
d 
 
ffect presents a more realistic 
picture than the idealistic picture of representation put forward with civil society speaking 
t sectors would seem to prefer 
rather than deal with a range of often conflicting voices.  
ed by 
some respondents interviewed,9 as a factor impacting on civil society participation. It is 
use pment 
rel
nd 
 
erging as the fourth 
exist at the same time. At all the stages the presence of and interaction with 
international organisations are linked in various degrees to power differences, with unequal 
al 
 civil 
onal 
with one neat unified (but diluted) voice which governmen
INTERNATIONAL VS LOCAL DYNAMICS  
The strong presence of international organisations in Tanzania has also been highlight
ful to explore this dynamic by looking at the four different stages in the develo
ations and operations of international NGOs as put forward by Simbi and Thom:  
There once was a time when many northern NGOs ran development projects by 
themselves, employing staff in country, or using expatriates to oversee work. A seco
stage emerged when a number of northern NGOs … moved to a “partnership model” 
in which local organizations applied to northern NGOs to carry out development 
projects … Since the mid-1990s, this model has evolved into a third stage in which 
northern NGOs no longer simply provide funds, but must now also be seen to add value
and build capacity … Implementation by proxy appears to be em
stage in this progression … [where] the northern NGO defines the parameters of the 
relationship, assesses the African NGO, and has comprehensive management structures 
in place to ensure compliance. (Simbi and Thom 2000: 213-15) 
Interestingly, in Tanzania the first stage is still very much in practice although the other 
stages seem to 
relationships often resulting in disempowerment and ineffectiveness on the part of loc
organisations. 
According to respondents interviewed, the dynamics between international and local 
organisations in Tanzania’s participatory spaces, both at the level of government- and
society-created spaces, are seen to be linked to resources and capacity which internati
                                                 
9 Based on information obtained from direct interviews with members of the PF, other civil society 
organisations, donor organisations, and government officials.  
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organisations are said to have the advantage over in terms of control of allocation.10 Thu
at one level, government seems to be more responsive to international organisations 
(INGOs), for instance, in terms of access to information and taking their views into 
account, since government more often views INGOs as donors or, if not, then as more 
closely linked to donors. The strong international influence coupled with the large numb
of INGOs operating within Tanzania results in tension which undermines the work 
local organisations described by Sarah Michael (2004: 88) as ‘a crowding out’ of local wo
Local organisations are often seen as less capable of doing the work when INGOs with 
greater capacity come to do the same work. Less support is then provided for lo
organisations, thus reinforcing the cycle of resource poverty am
s 
ers 
of 
rk. 
cal 
ong local organisations. 
Instead, international organisations should rather be strengthening the capacity of local 
org
rep
 
hen it looks like local NGOs are not doing anything and then less support 
GOs 
Os as a 
owever, this particular donor 
representative also pointed to the problem of INGOs being ‘ignorant of the subtleties of 
eing 
s 
d an 
is instance was seen to have ‘played the international card to 
get the dissident voice out by conveniently and arbitrarily changing the rules.’ The 
f 
rom and 
 
anisations with INGOs serving as resource organisations, as indicated by a 
resentative of a local organisation:  
There is a lot of tension between local and international organisations because a lot of 
them come to do the same work which local NGOs do but they win because they have
the money. T
is given to local NGOs … International NGOs are taking up space and responsibility of 
local NGOs. If they are true partners they would strengthen local ones so they can do 
better.11  
From this perspective, local organisations are seen to be competing with resident IN
for participatory space and resources. Local organisations are seen to perceive ING
threat. A donor perspective attributes this perception to ‘local organisations not [being] 
mature enough to see international organisations as complementing their work and 
therefore the competitive tension plays itself out.’ H
Tanzania’s social and political dynamics’ and thus contributing to the problem by not b
sensitive to these dynamics and overlooking them. 
To further complicate matters, government has also on occasion used the local versu
international representation card to its advantage. For instance, one organisation ha
‘international’ member serving on one of the government-instituted technical committees 
but when this individual presented a conflicting position, the representation on the 
committee was limited to local Tanzanian organisations (and, by implication, local 
individuals). Government in th
respondent involved viewed this as an instance which made clear ‘how unclear the rules o
the [participatory] game are.’  
A more positive strategy put forward is that local and international organisations have to 
collaborate in the sense of ‘teaming up to use the best base of resources’ to learn f
act upon. As a strategy, the PF has attempted to broaden representation by also bringing in
diverse groups from different geographical areas to cover a wider range of the interests of 
                                                 
10 The observations and views discussed in this paragraph were indicated by respondents from both 
local and international organisations, although local organisations tended to have stronger views in 
favour of less direct international involvement. 
11 Direct interview with representative of a local organization in Tanzania, August 2006. 
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the people. In addition, to counter this potentially problematic dynamic of being 
dominated by international organisations, it consciously applies ‘self-evaluation to ensure 
that there is a limited number of international members on the executive committee as well 
as within its membership base’ so that it is not seen as an international body but ‘Tanzan
led and inspired’. In this way it attempts to consciously guard the balance between local 
and international participation with the aim of ensuring effective policy engagement.  
In contrast to the resident INGOs, also noted by Michael (2004: 79), is ‘the very strong 
relationships that many Tanzanian NGOs have developed with non-operational northern 
NGOs resident abroad
ian 
d 
to 
s experiences in the PF indicate, the 
ded 
d 
ntial 
 in 
tional CSOs is regarded as the better way to operate. Teaming up, 
cal 
o the related goal of a 
gement, respondents felt that there seems to 
often 
                                                
12—relationships local NGOs see as key factors in their success an
survival’. The interviewees in this study made a similar point by referring to the flexible 
support provided by some donor NGOs abroad which has contributed to their abilities 
operate successfully within the policy arena. Yet, a
‘partnership’ relationship—increasingly showing signs of ‘implementation by proxy’—is 
also not without problems. Showing an awareness of the latest trends, the PF has deci
to engage in a fundraising strategy based on maintaining independence and also to avoi
stringent time-consuming reporting procedures as a particular feature of the 
‘implementation by proxy’ stage. As a result, they have had to turn away some pote
donors displaying behaviour typical of this stage.  
The main difference noted between locally active, resident international organisations and 
non-resident northern NGOs is the emphasis the latter places on providing resource 
support to strengthen local capacity rather than crowding out local work. The current 
reality is that there are many international NGOs operating locally in Tanzania resulting
experiences and views that this diminishes the role local organisations can play in 
Tanzania’s development process. Some respondents have pointed out that teaming up 
between local and interna
however, requires the sensitivity to focus on strengthening the capacity of lo
organisations and local community members, so that it contributes t
less externally-dependent Tanzania. This sensitivity is required to enable building more 
equitable relations between local and international organisations if local civil society 
organisations are to be in a better position to take more responsibility for Tanzania’s 
development.13  
ENGAGING IN LARGER POLITICAL PROCESSES 
In terms of the content of participatory enga
be a stronger focus on narrowly tackling immediate local issues on the grassroots level, 
without necessarily and vigorously linking these to larger political processes which are 
 
12 ‘Non-operational northern NGOs resident abroad’ refers to NGOs that are not locally active in 
terms of direct project work, in the sense that they partner local organisations by providing 
resource support, either in the form of funding (as donor organisations), information linkages and 
capacity development support, etc.  
13 The issue of ‘equitable relations’ requires more explanation which cannot be adequately dealt with 
in the scope of this paper, but for purposes of understanding, the interviews conducted for this 
study and the literature consulted suggest that it relates to and depends on, among others,  access to 
resources, participatory opportunities and invitations extended by government, partnership 
dynamics between local and international organisations, access to capacity development 
opportunities, influence and power, and cooperation. 
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limited to those in political power (also extending beyond the national sphere). Termed by 
Tendler for instance, as ‘micro-ization’, it is regarded as ‘distracting or diverting attention 
from social policy problems that require more aggregative solutions’ (cited in Gould 2005: 
50). 
One such issue highlighted was the macroeconomic stabilisation programme—which is 
one of the three pillars of the PRS, along with poverty reduction and participation. A 
pertinent question posed by a CS actor was whether the participation of civil society, which
was now strongly encouraged by government and donors, also involved ‘more consultat
on macroeconomic stabilisation’. Various reports have pointed to the fact that to reach 
HIPC decision point, the government had to agree to a new funding agreement with th
IMF for a three-year period, known as the Po
 
ion 
the 
e 
verty Reduction and Growth Facility. This 
agr
per t 
ma lf 
nec
20 tarting point a focus on macro-micro 
linkages. It emphasises that 
o 
 
ain excluded from these core areas of debate [the macroeconomic 
 
 
society organisations to determine alternative strategies. These strategies include more 
eement is described as ‘encompassing nearly three dozen non-negotiable conditions 
taining to the government’s economic and fiscal policies’ (Gould 2005: 25). These stric
croeconomic policy conditionalities thus form the basis for new lending—itse
essitated by macroeconomic reform policies. The PF’s acclaimed input paper at the 
02 Consultative Group Meeting takes as its s
… the poor, in particular the rural poor, seem not to have benefited from a decade and a 
half of pro-market reform and enhanced macro-economic stability … [and hence] … the 
arguments that macro-economic stabilization is a precondition for growth, that 
liberalization promoted growth, and that growth benefits the poor are not supported by 
the evidence. (NGO Policy Forum 2002: 1)  
The PF goes further to challenge the government by asking ‘What are the opportunities t
publicly debate these issues in the interest of promoting pro-poor development?’ (NGO
Policy Forum 2002: 2). So while some CSOs may have been taken on as equal partners in 
some instances, ‘they rem
framework and future debt sustainability] beyond participation in the PER process’ (Evans 
2003: 265). While key advocacy organisations within the PF have taken the macroeconomic
concerns on board in their individual capacities and spaces, the political will of 
government—also seen as constrained by donor conditionalities—does not leave much 
room for effective engagement on macroeconomic policy and its linkages to the micro 
policy discussions.  
Since the government/donor-initiated space (the invited space)14 then leaves little room for
thorough engagement with the larger political issues, it becomes necessary for civil society 
to create its own spaces (the claimed, self-created space) for deeper and perhaps more 
robust larger political engagement. Therefore, besides voicing their concerns within the 
invited participatory spaces, some organisations have also opted for alternative self-created 
spaces to influence policy more effectively by coming together independently as civil 
independent alternative policy analysis and critique, presenting alternatives to government-
                                                 
14 Here I draw on Gaventa’s (2003) work which provides a useful distinction between the various 
socio-political spaces and their related power dynamics. He distinguishes between invited spaces
(official ‘top–down’ government initiatives) and claimed or self-created spaces (more spontaneous,
independent, ‘bottom-up’ civil society initiatives). 
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led policy decisions, working through the media, independent monitoring of policy 
processes including implementation, as well as raising awareness in communities around 
citizenship rights in policy development. A key strategy is that of strengthening civil society 
lin  
Th
An
lly shift towards more independent analysis and monitoring of policy 
nts point out, for civil society to organise and mobilise to engage at 
the level of the larger political processes, policy engagement cannot be limited to the 
n; 
y 
ver time by 
constantly re-assessing and evaluating its own effectiveness in policy engagement. Such 
continuous critical assessment is necessary to ensure that participation is not limited to the 
level of consultation, but that it is re-politicised to effect the necessary structural changes to 
transform situations which create and perpetuate conditions of poverty.  
                                                
kages, and also nurturing social movement activity15 and direct citizen engagement.16
e PF itself has seen the necessity for a shift in its operations as reflected in the 2006 
nual Plan:  
… we will gradua
developments that is not exclusively linked to our participation in government-led policy 
processes. Although we will still continue to seek strategic and selective engagement with 
key policy initiatives, this will no longer be the primary focus of our activities. (Policy 
Forum 2006: 4)  
Thus, as the responde
invited space or limited to completely autonomous spaces.  
CONCLUSION 
This paper has emphasised the following positions in relation to civil society participation 
in policy processes: engaging in both invited and autonomous spaces to avoid co-optatio
forming strategic coalitions to avoid situations of dominance and control; informing 
representation by political responsibility; front-stage local engagement with back-stage 
international support; and linking the macro and micro policy considerations within larger 
political processes. Within the often fast-paced changing conditions, civil society actors 
need to remain aware and alert to these changes. Effective responses require a level of 
flexibility in terms of particular positions taken at any given moment to ensure that the 
particular goals which are informed by a focus on poverty eradication and citizen rights are 
effectively worked towards. This requires an ability to seize and stretch the participator
spaces made available by government and to create alternative spaces of engagement to 
influence policy processes and development choices to a greater extent. The Policy Forum 
as a network coalition has demonstrated such an awareness and alertness to adapt its focus, 
engagement and organisational structure to suit the changing conditions o
 
15 Gould’s analysis of the Tanzanian situation is that there are increasingly systematic attempts on 
the part of government (and certain donor agencies) to act against actors and associations with 
social movement potential in order to gain consensus for a specific development path rather than 
encourage genuine debate on Tanzania’s development options (Gould 2005: 63).  
16 The emphasis on direct citizen engagement was put forward by the former Policy Forum 
chairperson, particularly highlighting that ‘deep social change requires political engagement which in 
turn requires a politicised citizen engagement since social change will come not when policy 
changes occur but when citizens are aware and informed and able to engage.’ 
16 Hermine Engel 
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